Imagine this scenario.
For thirty years, you’ve been paying for your neighbor’s home security system. You don’t mind at first—it makes the whole neighborhood safer, and you can afford it.
But lately, something’s changed. Your neighbor doesn’t thank you anymore. Instead, they lecture you about your lawn care, your recycling habits, your moral failings. They invoke “the right side of history” while you’re still picking up the tab.
Eventually, you’d stop paying. Not because security doesn’t matter. Because the person giving the sermon isn’t the person paying the bill.
This is what’s happening across the Atlantic right now.
The alliance between America and Europe is not collapsing because the West has run out of ideals. It’s collapsing because those ideals have become unpriced—and in politics, anything unpriced eventually gets repriced by anger.
The Invoice Nobody Wanted to See
In January 2026, NATO’s secretary-general Mark Rutte stood before EU lawmakers in Brussels and said something that would have been unthinkable five years ago.
He mocked the idea that Europe could defend itself without America.
Without the U.S., he said, Europe would lose “the ultimate guarantor” of its freedom—America’s nuclear umbrella.
The subtext was clear: Good luck defending yourselves.
This wasn’t just a taunt. It was a receipt. Thirty years’ worth.
It reminded Europeans of an uncomfortable truth they try not to say out loud: their entire security architecture has been subsidized—explicitly and implicitly—by American power.
You can dislike the tone of the invoice. You cannot pretend it doesn’t exist.
And then there’s Greenland. The mere fact that talk of U.S. pressure and potential annexation entered mainstream discussion—requiring hurried diplomatic management—makes the alliance feel less like a family and more like a hostile takeover in slow motion.
What Changed? The Language of the Alliance
The Atlantic alliance was never only about tanks and treaties.
It was also built on assumptions:
That Article 5 is not a bargaining chip.
That allies are not “consumables.”
That solidarity is not conditional on flattery.
Those assumptions are eroding.
Washington’s posture has shifted from commitment to contingency—from “we defend you because you are us” to “we defend you if you meet the price and the politics.”
The alliance’s grammar now looks like dealmaking.
Consider the evidence. Since Trump’s return to office, the Washington Post has reported that the U.S. military has pulled back from parts of Europe while pressing allies to take greater control of collective defense, including reductions in advisory participation and security assistance.
If the old alliance ran on shared purpose, the new one runs on leverage.
The Sermon-Invoice Problem (Or: Why Europeans Lecture and Americans Roll Their Eyes)
Here’s the dynamic many analysts tiptoe around because it sounds impolite.
But it’s politically potent:
Europe often speaks in the register of norms—multilateralism, human rights, the rules-based order, “the right side of history.”
America increasingly speaks in the register of costs—who pays, who benefits, who is freeloading.
When the party delivering the sermon is not the party paying the bill, resentment is predictable.
Not because morality is wrong.
But because moral authority feels illegitimate when it’s funded by someone else’s wallet.
The Trumpist Translation
This is precisely why Trumpism has such a natural foreign-policy shape.
It turns the diffuse, long-term transaction (America underwriting European security) into a visible, short-term transaction: “If you want protection, show me the money.”
It is the politics of explicit pricing.
Take Ukraine. In July 2025, Politico reported that Trump’s support for Ukraine was explicitly framed inside “America First”: European allies would finance U.S.-made weapons for Ukraine rather than the United States footing the bill.
This preserved Trump’s claim that allies have benefited unfairly from American defense spending.
Read that again. The point is not whether the policy is good or bad. The point is the frame: support becomes acceptable if it is paid for by “very rich” Europeans.
In other words, the war is still strategic—but the justification is bookkeeping.
“But Doesn’t America Benefit Too?”
You might be thinking: doesn’t America benefit from European bases? From forward deployment? From intelligence sharing?
Yes. Absolutely.
But here’s the catch: those benefits are largely invisible to American voters, while the costs—troop deployments, defense budgets, perceived ingratitude—are highly visible.
And in democratic politics, salience matters more than substance.
When American voters hear about NATO, they don’t think “forward deterrence.” They think “we’re subsidizing rich countries who won’t pay their fair share.”
Europe’s Journey Through Grief
The Economist recently mapped Europe’s response to this new reality onto the five stages of grief.
It’s not just a clever metaphor. It’s a useful diagnostic:
Denial: “Trump won’t come back.”
Anger: Munich speeches, humiliation, tariffs, pressure.
Bargaining: Flattery, concessions, promises to spend more.
Depression: The realization that concessions don’t restore trust.
Acceptance: Building policy on the assumption that America may not show up—reliably, warmly, or at all.
You can see the “bargaining” phase in the theater of summits.
The Washington Post reported that at the 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, Trump offered a full-throated endorsement of NATO after allies agreed to significantly increase defense spending—an outcome leaders sought through praise, hospitality, and accommodation.
But bargaining has limits.
It may buy time. It does not buy back certainty.
Hence Europe’s “acceptance” phase is not quiet resignation. It is industrial planning.
The Price of Independence: Two Bills Europe Can’t Dodge
Acceptance sounds dignified. “Strategic autonomy.” “European sovereignty.” “Rearmament.”
In practice, it means paying two bills Europe has avoided for decades.
Bill #1: A Defense Budget Measured in GDP, Not Speeches
Rutte’s Brussels remarks included a brutal estimate:
Genuine self-reliance could require Europe to more than double current military spending, perhaps toward levels around 10% of GDP if it sought independent nuclear capabilities—precisely because America currently provides the ultimate deterrent.
Let that sink in. Ten percent of GDP.
That is not a marginal adjustment. That is a political revolution:
Welfare states competing with weapons systems.
Voters choosing between pensions and patrols.
Bill #2: A Trade War That Never Ends
If security decouples, trade friction follows.
America’s use of tariffs and economic pressure turns commerce into another arena of coercion.
Europe’s response will not remain rhetorical forever. It will become procedural—anti-coercion instruments, retaliation frameworks, industrial policy shields.
Europe’s “values” agenda survives only if Europe pays for its own deterrence and its own leverage. Otherwise, it remains a luxury brand sponsored by an increasingly irritated customer.
Why This Matters Beyond Europe
This is bigger than transatlantic drama.
It is a template for how alliances everywhere will behave in a world of polarized domestic politics and strained public finances.
A “values alliance” is stable when:
The costs are invisible,
The benefits feel mutual,
And leaders have room to talk about ideals without being punished at the ballot box.
A “transactional alliance” takes over when:
One side feels exploited,
The costs become salient,
And moral language is heard as condescension.
This is not unique to NATO. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia—every American ally will face the same question: How much independence can we afford, and how much dependence can we tolerate?
The Question Europe (and Every Ally) Must Answer
Europe’s old question—”Can America defend us?”—was easy.
The answer was yes, and the bill was deferred.
The new question is harder:
“How much independence can we afford, and how much dependence can we tolerate?”
The answer will be messy, expensive, and uneven across countries.
But the direction is set.
The Atlantic alliance is not dying because Europeans no longer believe in democracy, or because Americans no longer believe in Europe.
It is dying because the alliance’s moral narrative has outrun its financial settlement.
When sermons and invoices fall on different people, someone eventually stops listening—and someone else stops paying.
References
Associated Press — NATO secretary-general Mark Rutte argues Europe cannot defend itself without U.S. support; “good luck” without the U.S. nuclear umbrella; costs of self-reliance.
Politico (14 July 2025) — Trump frames Ukraine aid within “America First,” with Europeans financing U.S.-made weapons.
The Washington Post (25 June 2025) — NATO summit dynamics; allies’ spending pledges; leaders courting Trump; Trump embraces NATO after years of attacks.
The Washington Post (20 Jan 2026) — U.S. military pullback / reduced participation and pressure on European allies to take greater control of defense.
The Guardian live coverage (28 Jan 2026) — U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio urges NATO to be “reimagined,” with Europe taking greater responsibility; Greenland tension context.